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Abstract argumentation offers an appealing way of representing and eval-
uating arguments and counterarguments. This approach can be enhanced
by a probability assignment to each argument. There are various interpre-
tations that can be ascribed to this assignment. In this paper, we regard
the assignment as denoting the belief that an agent has that an argument is
justifiable, i. e., that both the premises of the argument and the derivation
of the claim of the argument from its premises are valid. This leads to the
notion of an epistemic extension which is the subset of the arguments in the
graph that are believed to some degree (which we defined as the arguments
that have a probability assignment greater than 0.5). We consider various
constraints on the probability assignment. Some constraints correspond to
standard notions of extensions, such as grounded or stable extensions, and
some constraints give us new kinds of extensions.
1 Introduction
Abstract argumentation, as proposed by Dung [Dun95], provides a simple and appealing
representation in the form of a directed graph. Each node denotes an argument and each
arc denotes one argument attacking another. Abstract argumentation also provides
a set of options for determining which arguments can be accepted together (i. e. an
extension), and which arguments can be rejected. Recently there has been interest in
augmenting abstract argumentation with a probabilistic assignment to each argument
[DT10, LON11, Hun12, Thi12]. Once we introduce a probability assignment to each
argument, we have extra information about the argumentation, and this means we can
refine the evaluation of an argument graph. In most of these proposals (i. e. [DT10,
1
LON11, Hun12]), the emphasis is on what should the structure of the graph be. So the
probability of the argument denotes the degree to which the argument should be in the
graph.
In this paper, we take a different approach. We regard the assignment as denoting
the belief that an agent has that an argument is justifiable, i. e., that both the premises
of the argument and the derivation of the claim of the argument from its premises are
valid. So for a probability function P , and an argument A, P (A) > 0.5 denotes that
the argument is believed (to the degree given by P (A)), P (A) < 0.5 denotes that the
argument is disbelieved (to the degree given by P (A)), and P (A) = 0.5 denotes that
the argument is neither believed or disbelieved. This approach leads to the notion of an
epistemic extension: This is the subset of the arguments in the graph that are believed to
some degree (i. e. the arguments such that P (A) > 0.5). Since this is a very general idea,
our aim in this paper is to consider various properties (i. e. constraints) that hold for
classes of probability functions, and for the resulting epistemic extensions. We structure
our presentation on two views as follows:
Standard view on using probability of arguments. In this view, we provide properties
for the probability function that ensure that the epistemic extensions coincide with
Dung’s definitions for extensions. Key properties include coherence (if A attacks
B, then P (A) ≤ 1−P (B)) and foundation (if A has no attackers, then P (A) = 1).
The advantage of using a probability function instead of Dung’s definitions is that
we can also specify the degree to which each argument is believed.
Non-standard view on using probability of arguments. In this view, we consider al-
ternative properties for the probability function. This means that the resulting
epistemic extensions may not coincide with Dung’s definitions for extensions.
The framework that we present in this paper is appealing theoretically as it provides
further insights into semantics for abstract argumentation, and it offers a finer-grained
representation of uncertainty in arguments. Perhaps more importantly, our framework
for probability functions is appealing practically because we can now model how au-
diences judge argumentation. Consider for example how a member of the audience of
a debate hears arguments and counterarguments, but is unable (or does not want) to
express arguments. Here it is natural to consider how that member of the audience con-
siders which arguments she believes, thereby constructing an epistemic extension. More
generally, if we want to make computational models of argument where we can capture
persuasion, we need to take account of the belief that participants or audiences have
in the individual arguments that are posited. We see the non-standard view as being
particularly important in addressing this need.
This paper builds on previous work [Thi12, Hun13] but extends it in several directions.
In particular, the contributions of this paper are as follows:
1. We investigate the notion of epistemic extensions and show their usefulness with
respect to classical extensions (Section 3).
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2. We adopt and significantly extend properties for standard epistemic extensions
from [Thi12, Hun13] and show that these probabilistic concepts coincide with their
corresponding concepts from abstract argumentation (Section 4).
3. We introduce non-standard epistemic extensions and a corresponding set of prop-
erties as a means to extend the standard view and provide a complete picture of
the relationships between our different probabilistic properties (Section 5).
4. We apply the notion of epistemic extensions to the problem of completing partial
probability assignments and show the feasibility of this approach (Section 6).
2 Preliminaries
An abstract argumentation framework AF is a tuple AF = (Arg,→) where Arg is a set
of arguments and → is a relation →⊆ Arg × Arg. For two arguments A,B ∈ Arg the
relation A → B means that argument A attacks argument B. For A ∈ Arg define
AttAF(A) = {B | B → A}.
Semantics are given to abstract argumentation frameworks by means of extensions
[Dun95] or labellings [WC10]. In this work, we use the latter. A labelling L is a
function L : Arg → {in, out, undec} that assigns to each argument A ∈ Arg either the
value in, meaning that the argument is accepted, out, meaning that the argument is
not accepted, or undec, meaning that the status of the argument is undecided. Let
in(L) = {A | L(A) = in} and out(L) resp. undec(L) be defined analogously. The set
in(L) for a labelling L is also called extension. A labelling L is called conflict-free if for
no A,B ∈ in(L) we have that A → B.
Arguably, the most important property of a semantics is its admissibility. A labelling
L is called admissible if and only if for all arguments A ∈ Arg
1. if L(A) = out then there is B ∈ Arg with L(B) = in and B → A, and
2. if L(A) = in then L(B) = out for all B ∈ Arg with B → A,
and it is called complete if, additionally, it satisfies
3. if L(A) = undec then there is no B ∈ Arg with B → A and L(B) = in and there is
a B′ ∈ Arg with B′ → A and L(B′) 6= out.
The intuition behind admissibility is that an argument can only be accepted if there are
no attackers that are accepted and if an argument is not accepted then there has to be
some reasonable grounds. The idea behind the completeness property is that the status
of an argument is only undec if it cannot be classified as in or out. Different types of
classical semantics can be phrased by imposing further constraints. Let AF = (Arg,→)
be an abstract argumentation framework and L : Arg → {in, out, undec} a complete
labelling. Then
• L is grounded if and only if in(L) is minimal,
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• L is preferred if and only if in(L) is maximal,
• L is stable if and only if undec(L) = ∅, and
• L is semi-stable if and only if undec(L) is minimal.
All statements on minimality/maximality are meant to be with respect to set inclusion.
Note that a grounded labelling is uniquely determined and always exists [Dun95].
3 Epistemic extensions
We now go beyond classical three-valued semantics of abstract argumentation and turn
to probabilistic interpretations of the status of arguments. Let 2X denote the power set
of a set X . A probability function P on some finite set X is a function P : 2X → [0, 1]
with
∑
X⊆X P (X) = 1. Let P : 2
Arg → [0, 1] be a probability function on Arg. We
abbreviate
P (A) =
∑
A∈E⊆Arg
P (E)
This means that the probability of an argument is the sum of the probabilities of all sets
of arguments that contain that argument. The following definition is a generalization of
the notion of epistemic extensions given in [Hun13]. For an argument A, it is labelled
in when it is believed to some degree (which we identify as P (A) > 0.5), it is labelled
out when it is disbelieved to some degree (which we identify as P (A) < 0.5), and it is
labelled undec when it is neither believed nor disbelieved (which we identify as P (A) =
0.5). More specifically, let AF = (Arg,→) be an abstract argumentation framework and
P : 2Arg → [0, 1] a probability function on Arg. The labelling LP : Arg→ {in, out, undec}
defined via the following constraints is called the epistemic labelling of P :
• LP (A) = in iff P (A) > 0.5
• LP (A) = out iff P (A) < 0.5
• LP (A) = undec iff P (A) = 0.5
The epistemic extension of P is the set of arguments that are labelled in by the epistemic
labelling, i. e. X is an epistemic extension iff X = in(LP ). Furthermore, we say that
a labelling L and a probability function P are congruent, denoted by L ∼ P , if for all
A ∈ Arg we have L(A) = in ⇔ P (A) = 1, L(A) = out ⇔ P (A) = 0, and L(A) =
undec ⇔ P (A) = 0.5. Note, that if L ∼ P then L = LP , i. e., if a labelling L and a
probability function P are congruent then L is also the epistemic labelling of P .
An epistemic labelling can be used to give either a standard semantics (as we will
investigate in Section 4) or a non-standard semantics (as we will investigate in Section
5).
To further illustrate the epistemic extensions, consider the graph given in Figure 1.
Here, we may believe that, say, A is valid and that B and C are not valid. In which case,
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A = Ann will go to
the party and this
means that Bob will
not go to the party
B = Bob will go to
the party and this
means that Chris will
not go to the party
C = Chris will go to
the party and this
means that Ann will
not go to the party
Figure 1: Example of three arguments in a simple cycle.
with this extra epistemic information about the arguments, we can resolve the conflict
and so take the set {A} as the “epistemic” extension. In contrast, there is only one
admissible set which is the empty set. So by having this extra epistemic information, we
get a more informed extension (in the sense that it has harnessed the extra information
in a sensible way).
In general, we want epistemic extensions to allow us to better model the audience of
argumentation. Consider, for example, when a member of the audience of a TV debate
listens to the debate at home, she can produce the abstract argument graph based on
the arguments and counterarguments exchanged. Then she can identify a probability
function to represent the belief she has in each of the arguments. So she may disbelieve
some of the arguments based on what she knows about the topic. Furthermore, she
may disbelieve some of the arguments that are unattacked. As an extreme, she is at
liberty of completely disbelieving all of the arguments (so to assign probability 0 to all
of them). If we want to model audiences, where the audience either does not want to
or is unable to add counterarguments to an argument graph being constructed in some
form of argumentation, we need to take the beliefs of the audience into account, and we
need to consider which arguments they believe or disbelieve.
4 Standard epistemic extensions
We now consider some constraints on the probability function which may take different
aspects of the structure of the argument graph into account. We will show how these
constraints are consistent with Dung’s notions of admissibility.
For the remainder of this paper let AF = (Arg,→) be an abstract argumentation
framework and P : 2Arg → [0, 1]. Consider the following properties (note that COH is
from [Hun13] and JUS is from [Thi12]):
COH P is coherent wrt. AF if for every A,B ∈ Arg, if A → B then P (A) ≤ 1− P (B).
SFOU P is semi-founded wrt. AF if P (A) ≥ 0.5 for every A ∈ Arg with AttAF(A) = ∅.
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A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6
P1 0.2 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.6 1
P2 0.7 0.3 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.4
P3 0.7 0.3 0.7 0.3 0 1
P4 0.7 0.8 0.9 0.8 0.7 1
P5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Table 1: Some probability functions for Example 1
FOU P is founded wrt. AF if P (A) = 1 for every A ∈ Arg with AttAF(A) = ∅.
SOPT P is semi-optimistic wrt. AF if P (A) ≥ 1−
∑
B∈AttAF(A)
P (B) for every A ∈ Arg
with AttAF(A) 6= ∅.
OPT P is optimistic wrt. AF if P (A) ≥ 1−
∑
B∈AttAF(A)
P (B) for every A ∈ Arg.
JUS P is justifiable wrt. AF if P is coherent and optimistic.
TER P is ternary wrt. AF if P (A) ∈ {0, 0.5, 1} for every A ∈ Arg.
We explain these constraints as follows: COH ensures that if argument A attacks ar-
gument B, then the degree to which A is believed caps the degree to which B can be
believed; SFOU ensures that if an argument is not attacked, then the argument is not
disbelieved (i. e. P (A) ≥ 0.5); FOU ensures that if an argument is not attacked, then
the argument is believed without doubt (i. e. P (A) = 1); SOPT ensures that the be-
lief in A is bounded from below if the belief in its attackers is not high; OPT ensures
that if an argument is not attacked, then the argument is believed without doubt (i. e.
P (A) = 1) and that the belief in A is bounded from below if the belief in its attackers is
not high; JUS combines COH and OPT to provide bounds on the belief in an argument
based on the belief in its attackers and attackees; and TER ensures that the probability
assignment is a three-valued assignment.
Example 1. Consider the abstract argumentation framework AF = (Arg,→) depicted in
Fig. 2 and the probability functions depicted in Table 1 (note that the probability functions
there are only partially defined by giving the probabilities of arguments). The following
observations can be made: 1.) P1 is semi-founded, founded, but neither coherent, opti-
mistic, semi-optimistic, ternary, nor justifiable, 2.) P2 is coherent and semi-optimistic,
but neither semi-founded, founded, optimistic, ternary, nor justifiable, 3.) P3 is coher-
ent, semi-optimistic, semi-founded, founded, optimistic, and justifiable, but not ternary,
4.) P4 is semi-founded, founded, optimistic, and semi-optimistic, but neither coher-
ent, justifiable, nor ternary, and 5.) P5 is coherent, semi-founded, semi-optimistic, and
ternary but neither optimistic, justifiable, nor founded.
Let P be the set of all probability functions, P(AF) be the set of all probabil-
ity functions on Arg, and Pt(AF) be the set of all t-probability functions with t ∈
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A1 A2 A3
A4
A5 A6
Figure 2: A simple argumentation framework
{COH,SFOU,FOU, OPT,SOPT,JUS,TER}. We obtain the following relationships between
the different classes of probability functions.
Proposition 1. Let AF = (Arg,→) be an abstract argumentation framework.
1. ∅ ( PJUS(AF) ( PCOH(AF) ( P(AF)
2. POPT(AF) = PSOPT(AF) ∩ PFOU(AF).
3. PFOU(AF) ( PSFOU(AF).
4. ∅ ( PTER(AF) ( P(AF).
For the proof of item 1.) of the above proposition see [Thi12] and [Hun13]. The
remaining relationships follow directly from these definitions.
For all probability functions P such that LP is admissible in the classical sense, we
have that P assigns some degree of belief to each argument that is unattacked, thereby
P satisfies the SFOU constraint.
Proposition 2. For all probability functions P , if LP is admissible then P ∈ PSFOU(AF).
Proof. Assume LP is admissible. Therefore, if LP (A) = out, then there is an argument
B such that B → A and LP (A) = in. Therefore, if AttAF(A) = ∅, then LP (A) 6= out.
Therefore, if AttAF(A) = ∅, then P (A) ≥ 0.5. Therefore, P ∈ PSFOU(AF).
We can further constrain a probability assignment, so that the epistemic labelling
straightforwardly captures the standard semantics (i. e. Dung’s semantics). By setting
the probability function appropriately, its epistemic labelling corresponds to grounded,
complete, stable, preferred, or semi-stable labellings. All we require is a three-valued
probability function that simulates each complete labelling function. For this, we provide
the following definition that provides the counter-part in our framework for a complete
labelling.
Definition 1. Let AF = (Arg,→) be an argumentation framework. Then a complete
probability function P ∈ P(AF) for AF is a probability function P such that for every
A ∈ Arg the following conditions hold:
1. P ∈ PTER(AF);
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2. if P (A) = 1 then P (B) = 0 for all B ∈ Arg with B → A;
3. if P (B) = 0 for all B with B → A then P (A) = 1;
4. if P (A) = 0 then there is B ∈ Arg with P (B) = 1 and B → A;
5. if P (B) = 1 for some B with B → A then P (A) = 0.
Note that the above definition straightforwardly follows the definition of completeness
for classical semantics. Therefore, we have that P is a complete probability function if
and only if there is a complete labeling L and P ∼ L.
Completeness of probability functions can be characterized by the aforementioned
properties as follows.
Proposition 3. For an argument graph AF, and for P ∈ P(AF), P is a complete
probability function iff P ∈ PCOH(AF) ∩ PFOU(AF) ∩ PTER(AF).
Proof. (⇒) Assume P is a complete probability function. By Definition 1 Part 1,
P ∈ PTER(AF). By Definition 1 Part 3, if AttAF(A) = ∅, then P (A) = 1, and hence
P ∈ PFOU(AF). By Definition 1 Parts 2 to 5,
• P (A) = 1 iff for all B s.t. B → A, P (B) = 0
• P (A) = 0.5 iff there is not an B s.t. B → A, P (B) = 1 and there is a B′ s.t.
B′ → A, P (B′) = 0.5
• P (A) = 0 iff there is a B s.t. B → A, P (B) = 1
So for all attacks B → A, P (A) ≤ 1 − P (B). Hence, P ∈ PCOH(AF). (⇐) Assume
P ∈ PCOH(AF)∩PFOU(AF)∩PTER(AF). We now show that Parts 1 to 5 of Definition 1 are
satisfied for P . From P ∈ PTER(AF), P satisfies Part 1. From P ∈ PCOH(AF)∩PFOU(AF),
P satisfies Parts 2 and 3. From P ∈ PCOH(AF), P satisfies Parts 4 and 5.
In the same way that Caminada and Gabbay [CG09] showed that different semantics
can be obtained by imposing further restrictions on the choice of labelling, we can ob-
tain the different semantics by imposing further restrictions on the choice of complete
probability function. These constraints, as shown in the following result, involve mini-
mizing or maximizing particular assignments. So for instance, if the assignment of 1 to
arguments is maximized, then a preferred labelling is obtained.
Proposition 4. Let AF = (Arg,→) be an abstract argumentation framework and P ∈
P(AF). If P is a complete probability function for AF and the restriction specified in
Table 2 holds for P , then the corresponding type of epistemic labelling is obtained.
Proof. Let L and P be congruent. So L is a complete labelling iff P is a complete
probability assignment. Therefore, each restriction in Section 2 holds for L iff the cor-
responding restriction in Table 2 holds for P . For instance, “Maximal number of argu-
ments A such that L(A) = undec” holds iff “Maximal number of arguments A such that
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Restriction on probability function P Classical semantics
No restriction complete extensions
No arguments A such that P (A) = 0.5 stable
Maximal no. of A such that P (A) = 1 preferred
Maximal no. of A such that P (A) = 0 preferred
Maximal no. of A such that P (A) = 0.5 grounded
Minimal no. of A such that P (A) = 1 grounded
Minimal no. of A such that P (A) = 0 grounded
Minimal no. of A such that P (A) = 0.5 semi-stable
Table 2: Correspondences between probabilistic and classical semantics
P (A) = 0.5” holds. Therefore, the corresponding type of extension for the restriction
on L (as listed in Section 2 and proven to hold by Caminada and Gabbay in [CG09]),
also hold for the equivalent restriction on P in the Table 2.
For an argumentation framework AF we can identify specific probability functions in
P ∈ PJUS(AF) that are congruent with admissible labellings, grounded labellings, or
stable labellings, for AF as follows.
Proposition 5. (From [Thi12]) Let AF = (Arg,→) be an abstract argumentation frame-
work.
1. For every admissible L there is P ∈ PJUS(AF) with L ∼ P .
2. Let L be the grounded labelling and let1 P = argmaxQ∈PJUS(Arg)H(Q). Then L ∼
P .
3. Let stable labellings exist for AF and let L be a stable labelling. Then there is
P ∈ argminQ∈PJUS(Arg)H(Q) with L ∼ P .
So Proposition 4 and Proposition 5 provide two ways to identify probability functions
that capture specific types of labellings. Each of these results show that standard notions
of classical semantics (i. e. admissibility and the definitions for different kinds of labelling
such as grounded labellings, stable labellings, etc.) can be captured using probability
functions.
The next result shows that using probability functions to capture labellings gives a
finer-grained formalization of classical semantics.
Proposition 6. For each complete labelling L, if there is an argument A such that
L(A) 6= undec, then there are infinitely many probability functions P such that LP = L.
Proof. Let L be a complete labeling such that there is an argumentA with L(A) 6= undec.
Without loss of generality assume that L(A) = in. Then every probability function with
1Define the entropy H(P ) of P as H(P ) = −
∑
E⊆Arg
P (E) logP (E)
9
P (B) = 0.5 iff L(B) = undec, P (B) = 0 iff L(B) = out, P (B) = 1 iff L(B) = in and
B 6= A, and P (A) ∈ (0.5, 1] yields LP = L.
Obviously, for every probability function P , there is by definition exactly one epistemic
labelling LP . This means that using a probability function to identify which arguments
are in, undec, or out, subsumes using labels. Furthermore, the probability function cap-
tures more information about the arguments. The granularity can differentiate between
for example a situation where A is believed (i. e. it is in) with certainty by P (A) = 1
from a situation where A is only just believed (i. e. it is only just in) for example by
P (A) = 0.51. Similarly, we can differentiate a situation where an attack by B on A is
undoubted when P (B) = 1 and P (A) = 0 from a situation where an attack by B on A
is very much doubted when for example P (B) = 0.55 and P (A) = 0.45.
In conclusion, we have shown how axioms can be used to constrain the probabil-
ity function, and thereby constrain the epistemic labelings and the epistemic extensions.
This allows us to subsume Dung’s notions of extensions as epistemic extensions. Further-
more, we get a finer-grained representation of the labelling of arguments by representing
the belief in each of the arguments.
5 Non-standard epistemic extensions
Before exploring the notion of non-standard epistemic extensions, we will augment the
set of properties we introduced in the previous section with the following properties. Let
AF = (Arg,→) be an abstract argumentation framework and P : 2Arg → [0, 1].
RAT P is rational wrt. AF if for every A,B ∈ Arg, if A → B then P (A) > 0.5 implies
P (B) ≤ 0.5.
NEU P is neutral wrt. AF if P (A) = 0.5 for every A ∈ Arg.
INV P is involutary wrt. AF if for every A,B ∈ Arg, if A → B, then P (A) = 1− P (B).
MAX P is maximal wrt. AF if P (A) = 1 for every A ∈ Arg.
MIN P is minimal wrt. AF if P (A) = 0 for every A ∈ Arg.
We explain these constraints as follows: RAT ensures that if argument A attacks argu-
ment B, and A is believed (i. e. P (A) > 0.5), then B is not believed (i. e. P (B) ≤ 0.5);
NEU ensures that all arguments are neither believed nor disbelieved (i. e. P (A) = 0.5
for all arguments); INV ensures that if argument A attacks argument B, then the belief
in A is the inverse of the belief in B; MAX ensures that all arguments are completely
believed; and MIN ensures that all arguments are completely disbelieved.
Example 2. We continue Example 1, the abstract argumentation framework AF =
(Arg,→) depicted in Fig. 2, and the probability functions depicted in Table 1. The
following observations can be made: 1.) P2 and P3 are rational but neither neutral,
involutary, maximal, nor minimal, 2.) P1 and P4 are neither rational, neutral, involu-
tary, maximal, nor minimal, and 3.) P5 is rational, neutral, and involutary but neither
maximal nor minimal.
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P(AF)
PSFOU(AF)
PRAT(AF)
PSOPT(AF)
PFOU(AF)
PCOH(AF) POPT(AF)
PJUS(AF)PINV(AF)
PNEU(AF)
PTER(AF)
PMIN(AF)
PMAX(AF)
∅
Figure 3: Classes of probability functions (a normal arrow → indicates a strict subset
relation, a dashed arrow 99K indicates a subset relation)
As before let Pt(AF) be the set of all t-probability functions with t ∈ {COH,SFOU,
FOU, SOPT, OPT, JUS, TER, RAT, NEU, INV, MAX, MIN}. We extend the classification
from Proposition 1 as follows.
Proposition 7. Let AF = (Arg,→) be an abstract argumentation framework.
1. ∅ ( PJUS(AF) ( PCOH(AF) ( PRAT(AF) ( P(AF)
2. ∅ ( PNEU(AF) ⊆ PINV(AF) ( PCOH(AF)
3. ∅ ( PINV(AF) ( PSOPT(AF)
4. ∅ ( PMIN(AF) ( PCOH(AF)
5. ∅ ( PMAX(AF) ( POPT(AF)
Proof. We only give the proof for 2.). The proofs for 1.) can be found in [Thi12] and
[Hun13], the remaining proofs are straightforward.
The probability function P with P (E) = 1/|2Arg| for all E ⊆ Arg has P (A) = 0.5
for all A ∈ Arg and is therefore neutral. It follows that PNEU(AF) 6= ∅ for every AF.
Furthermore, if P ∈ PNEU(AF) then for every A,B ∈ Arg, if A → B we have trivially
P (A) = 1−P (B), so P ∈ PINV(AF) and then also P (A) ≤ 1−P (B), i. .e, P ∈ PCOH(AF).
Finally, for AF = (Arg,→) with Arg = {A,B} and→= {(A,B)} any probability function
P with P (A) = 0.4 and P (B) = 0.4 is coherent but not involutary.
Together with Examples 1 and 2 we obtain the strict classification of classes of prob-
ability functions as depicted in Figure 3.
The RAT constraint is a weaker version of the COH constraint, and it can be used to
capture each admissible labelling as a probability function.
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Proposition 8. If L is an admissible labelling, then there is a P ∈ PRAT(AF) such that
L ∼ P .
Furthermore, the epistemic labelling corresponding to each probability function that
satisfies the RAT property is conflict-free.
Proposition 9. Let AF = (Arg,→) be an abstract argumentation framework. For each
P ∈ PRAT(AF ), in(LP ) is a conflict-free set of arguments in AF.
Proof. Assume P ∈ PRAT(AF). So for each A → B, either P (A) ≤ 0.5 or P (B) ≤ 0.5.
Therefore, for each A → B, if LP (A) = in, then LP (B) 6= in, and if LP (B) = in, then
LP (A) 6= in. Hence, in(LP ) is a conflictfree set of arguments in AF.
When the argument graph has odd cycles, there is no probability function that is
involutary, apart from a neutral probability function.
Proposition 10. Let AF = (Arg,→) be an abstract argumentation framework. If AF
contains an odd cycle (i. e. there is a sequence of attacks A1 → A2 → ...... → Ak where
A1 = Ak and k is an even number), and P ∈ PINV(AF) then P ∈ PNEU(AF).
Proof. Assume that there is a sequence of attacks A1 → A2 → ......→ Ak where A1 = Ak
and k is an even number. Let P (A1) = α. Hence, P (A2) = 1 − α, P (A3) = α, . . . ,
P (Ak−1) = α, P (Ak) = 1−α. Therefore, P (A1) = α and P (Ak) = 1−α. Yet A1 = Ak.
This is only possible if α = 0.5. Hence, P ∈ PNEU(AF).
Even when the graph is acyclic, it may be the case that there is no involutary prob-
ability function (apart from the neutral probability function). Consider for example an
argument graph containing three arguments A, B and C, with A attacking both B and
C, and B attacking C. For this, there is no involutary probability function (apart from
the neutral probability function). If we restrict consideration to trees, then we are guar-
anteed to have a probability function that is involutary and not neutral. But even here
there are constraints such as siblings have to have the same assignment as captured in
the next result.
Proposition 11. If P ∈ PINV(AF), then for all Bi,Bj ∈ AttAF(A) we have P (Bi) =
P (Bj).
Proof. Let Bi → A and Bj → A be attacks. Assume P ∈ PINV(AF). Therefore, P (A) =
1− P (Bi) and P (A) = 1− P (Bj). Hence, P (Bi) = P (Bj).
When P ∈ PMAX(AF), the probability function does not take the structure of the
graph into account. Hence, there is an incompatibility between a probability function
being maximal and a probability function being either rational or coherent (as shown in
the proposition below). However, there is compatibility between a probability function
being maximal and a probability function being founded since each P ∈ PMAX(AF) is in
PFOU(AF).
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Proposition 12. Let AF = (Arg,→) be an abstract argumentation framework. If there
are A,B ∈ Arg such that A → B, then PRAT(AF ) ∩ PMAX(AF ) = ∅.
Proof. Assume there is an attack A → B. So for all P ∈ PRAT(AF ), if P (A) = 1, then
P (B) ≤ 0.5, and P (B) = 1, then P (A) ≤ 0.5. And for all P ∈ PMAX(AF ), P (A) = 1
and P (B) = 1. So PRAT(AF ) ∩ PMAX(AF ) = ∅.
In conclusion, we have identified epistemic extensions that are obtained from ratio-
nal probability functions as being an appealing alternative to extensions obtained by
Dung’s definitions. Rational probability functions are more general than coherent prob-
ability functions, and allow the audience more flexibility in expressing their beliefs in
the arguments whilst taking the structure of the argument graph into account. We have
also considered alternatives such as the involutary probability functions but these are
over-constrained.
6 Application: Partial probability functions
Assigning a probability value to an argument can be useful for a variety of purposes such
as representing the belief that the premises of the argument are valid, or the belief that
the claim is valid given that the premises are valid, or the belief that both the premises
and claim are valid, or the belief that the argument should appear in the argument
graph, etc. However, given an argument graph, it may be difficult for a user to assign a
value to every argument. The user might have knowledge in order to identify a value for
some arguments, but the user may be unable or unwilling to make assignments to the
remaining arguments. This means that the user can only provide a partial assignment. If
this is the case, then it would be desirable to have techniques to handle this incomplete
information. Ideally, we would like to identify an appropriate assignment for all the
arguments based on the assignment to the subset of arguments.
More specifically, a partial function pi : Arg→ [0, 1] on Arg is called a partial probability
assignment. A probability function P ∈ P(Arg) is pi-compliant if for every A ∈ dompi
we have pi(A) = P (A). Let Ppi(AF) ⊆ P(AF) be the set of all pi-compliant probability
functions. The question that arises is that given an abstract argumentation framework
AF = (Arg,→) and a partial probability assignment pi, how do we determine P ∈ P(Arg)
that is most compatible with both AF and pi, i. e., which P ∈ P(Arg) do we select as
a meaningful representative? This question has also been addressed in similar ways for
partial probabilistic information without argumentation, cf. e. g. [Par94]. There, the
principle of maximum entropy has been used to complete incomplete probabilistic in-
formation in probabilistic logics. As a first step, we investigate the properties of the
sets of probability functions which are defined by our different axioms. An important
requirement for applying maximum entropy approaches is that the probability function
with maximum entropy is uniquely determined. A sufficient property to ensure this, is
that the set under consideration is both convex and closed.2 More generally, maximiz-
2A set X is convex if for x1, x2 ∈ X it also holds that δx1 + (1− δ)x2 ∈ X for every δ ∈ [0, 1]; a set X
is closed if for every converging sequence x1, x2, . . . with xi ∈ X (i ∈ N) we have that limi→∞ xi ∈ X
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ing any strictly convex function over a convex set has a unique solution and also most
interesting distance measures fall into this category. So if we are to identify probabil-
ity functions that complete the missing assignments, knowing that for specific sets of
probability functions (i. e. those that satisfy specific axioms) that they are convex and
closed, means that we may find an appropriate probability function.
Proposition 13. Let AF = (Arg,→) be an abstract argumentation framework.
1. The sets P(AF), PCOH(AF), PTER(AF), PNEU(AF), PINV(AF), PSFOU(AF), PFOU(AF),
POPT(AF), PSOPT(AF), PJUS(AF), PMIN(AF), PMAX(AF) are convex and closed.
2. The set PRAT(AF) is not convex but closed.
Proof.
1. Convexity and closure of P(AF) has been shown in e. g. [Par94], convexity and
closure of PJUS(AF) has been shown in [Thi12]. The convexity and closure of the
other sets follow from the fact that they are defined using linear equations without
strict inequality, cf. also [Thi12].
2. Let AF = (Arg,→) be given by Arg = {A,B} and →= (A,B). Consider P1, P2 ∈
PRAT(AF) with
P1(A) = 1 P1(B) = 0.4
P2(A) = 0.4 P2(B) = 0.8
For the convex combination P = 0.5P1 +0.5P2 we obtain P (A) = 0.7 and P (B) =
0.6, i. e. P /∈ PRAT(AF). However, PRAT(AF) is closed as for every converging
sequence P1, P2, . . . with Pi ∈ PRAT(AF) for all i ∈ N there is N ∈ N such that for
all A→ B either
• Pj(A) ≤ 0.5 for all j > N ; then limi→∞ Pj(A) ≤ 0.5 as well and the condition
of coherence is trivially satisfied, or
• Pj(A) > 0.5 and consequently Pj(B) ≤ 0.5 for all j > N ; then limi→∞ Pj(B) ≤
0.5 as well and the condition of coherence is satisfied in any case.
The above proposition suggests that most of our properties are suitable for convex
optimization problems such as maximum entropy estimation. Moreover, the same is
true for the notion of partial probability assignments.
Proposition 14. For every partial probability assignment pi the set Ppi(AF) is convex
and closed.
Proof. Let P1, P2 ∈ P
pi(AF) and consider the convex combination P = δP1+(1−δ)P2 for
some δ ∈ [0, 1]. For every A ∈ dom pi we have P (A) = δP1(A)+ (1− δ)P2(A) = δpi(A)+
(1−δ)pi(A) = pi(A) and therefore P ∈ Ppi(AF). Closure of Ppi(AF) is straightforward.
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Figure 4: Argumentation frameworks for Example 3
Let t be any one of our properties which lead to a convex and closed set of probability
functions (or any combination of those). If it is the case that there is at least one
pi-compliant P in Pt(AF) then (thanks to the convexity properties) we have that the
intersection of Ppi(AF) and Pt(AF) is convex and closed as well, cf. [Par94]. In that case,
we can select the probability function with maximal entropy within this intersection
(which is uniquely defined). As for the rationale of this decision, several results from
probability reasoning, as for example discussed in [Par94], could be harnessed. We
continue with some examples to illustrate the definitions and to investigate some of our
concerns in dealing with partial assignments.
Example 3. For the argumentation framework depicted in Figure 4(a) consider pi1 with
pi1(A) = 1. Obviously, the most reasonable choice for a pi1-compliant P ∈ P(AF) would
be P (A) = 1 and P (B) = 0 (by obeying the property of involution). Furthermore, for
pi2(B) = 0.3 we would have P (A) = 0.7 and P (B) = 0.3 following the same rationale.
For the argumentation framework depicted in Figure 4(b) consider pi3 with pi3(C) = 0.4.
A possible choice for P would be P (A) = 0.6, P (B) = 0.4, and P (C) = 0.4 (having thus a
maximally committed function that is coherent). But note that the set Ppi(AF)∩PCOH(AF)
does contain more than this single probability function. Furthermore, for pi4 with pi4(B) =
0.7 and pi4(C) = 0.6 one would only guess P (A) ≤ 0.3 but due to the “inconsistency” of
pi4 (violating the coherence condition), what is the best choice?
For the argumentation framework depicted in Figure 4(c) consider pi5 with pi5(A) = 0.4
and the following four selections P1, P2, P3, P4 ∈ P(AF):
P1(A) = 0.4 P2(A) = 0.4 P3(A) = 0.4 P4(A) = 0.4
P1(B) = 0.6 P2(B) = 0.4 P3(B) = 0.5 P4(B) = 0.2
P1(C) = 0.4 P2(C) = 0.6 P3(C) = 0.5 P4(C) = 0.3
All of the above probability functions are pi5-compliant and coherent. Function P4 is not
maximally committed and as such is perhaps not a good choice. Both P1 and P2 are
“extreme points of view” and model some kind of probabilistic stable semantics. The
function P3 is as unbiased as possible but still “reasonable” as it models probabilistic
grounded semantics. Note that P3 is also the probability function with maximal entropy
in Ppi(AF) ∩ PCOH(AF).
Given Ppi(AF) and Pt(AF), we can either select P ∈ P
pi(AF) that is “as close as
possible to” Pt(AF) or P ∈ Pt(AF) that is “as close as possible to” P
pi(AF). In future
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work, we will investigate definitions for “as close as possible to”, and we will explore the
pros and cons of each of these alternatives for selecting P .
7 Discussion
In this paper, we have investigated the use of a probability function to represent belief in
an argument. We use this to identify an epistemic labelling, and thereby an epistemic ex-
tension. The notion of an epistemic extension is very general as there are no constraints
on the probability function in general. However, we have considered various constraints
on the probability function leading to two views on using the probability functions,
namely the standard view, and the non-standard view. Many of the constraints on the
probability function that we have investigated take into account aspects of the struc-
ture of the argument graph. We applied our classification of properties of probabilistic
argumentation to the problem of completing partial probability assignments. A first
investigation leads us to believe that maximizing entropy within probability functions
of a specific type gives appropriate results for this problem. In future work, we will
investigate this issue in more depth.
The work in this paper contrasts with other research on introducing a probability
assignment to arguments such as [LON11]. There, a probability distribution over the
subgraphs of the argument graph is introduced, and this can then be used to give a
probability assignment for a set of arguments being an admissible set or extension of
the argument graph. They assume independence between arguments which in general
is not appropriate. To address this shortcoming, the set of spanning subgraphs can be
used as a sample space, thereby obviating the need for an independence assumption
between arguments [Hun12]. This probability distribution over subgraphs is used to
give a probability assignment to extensions. For a semantics X (such as grounded,
preferred, or stable), the probability that a set of arguments Γ is an extension according
to semantics X, denoted PX(Γ), is the sum of the probability assigned to the subgraphs
for which Γ is an extension according to semantics X. The uncertainty that is being
handled in [LON11, Hun12] is about the structure of the graph, and it is therefore a
different kind of uncertainty model to the being addressed by this paper. Similarly, the
work [JCV08] extends abstract argumentation by allowing the attack relation to be a
fuzzy relation.
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